▸ Treasurer walkthrough
Portfolio overview
Cost of funds · where did my margin go?
Blended rate moved from 2.50% to 2.68% over 12 months. The waterfall decomposes the shift so you can see every contributing driver.
Total deposits
OMR 11.3bn
+13.2% YoY outgrowing loans 2:1
Blended cost of funds
268 bps
+18 bps YoY · over 12m
CASA share of deposits
43.3%
−1.4 pp YoY · migrating to term
Net interest margin
2.42%
−12 bps YoY · the margin gap
Cost-of-funds waterfall · last 12 months
Opening rate → current rate
Signed contributions · click a bar to drill
Deposit composition
By product · weighted avg rate paid
| Product | Balance | Share | Rate | 12m Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current account | OMR 2.84bn | 25.1% | 0.00% | −3.2% |
| Savings | OMR 1.72bn | 15.2% | 0.85% | +1.4% |
| Al Mazyona | OMR 0.34bn | 3.0% | 0.10% | +8.7% |
| Term · 3m | OMR 1.24bn | 11.0% | 2.95% | +18.2% |
| Term · 6m | OMR 1.52bn | 13.5% | 3.42% | +22.8% |
| Term · 12m | OMR 2.18bn | 19.3% | 4.15% | +28.4% |
| Term · 24m+ | OMR 0.84bn | 7.4% | 4.68% | +9.4% |
| Meethaq (Islamic) | OMR 0.62bn | 5.5% | 3.28%* | +14.1% |
* Meethaq rate is distributed profit, not interest. See Meethaq Profit Rate module.
Top-50 concentration
Government & corporate relationships
Top 50 depositors hold 24.1% of total deposits. Government & quasi-government reported separately — their behaviour is policy-driven, not rate-driven.
| Relationship | Balance | Rate | Flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ministry of Finance (operational) | OMR 420m | 2.85% | Policy |
| PDO Treasury | OMR 310m | 3.95% | > 2% threshold |
| SAO sovereign fund | OMR 288m | 2.95% | Policy |
| Oman LNG | OMR 142m | 3.95% | — |
| Omantel operating | OMR 118m | 3.45% | — |
Click any relationship for detailed AI recommendations.
Maturity ladder · next 18 months
Term deposit maturities
Current rate vs rate-on-rollover-today · gain/(loss) per month
| Month | Maturing | Current rate | Rollover rate | Δ bps | Monthly impact |
|---|
Elasticity explorer
Four quadrants · 11,842 term customers
Every customer carries a modelled rate sensitivity. The distribution is where the repricing opportunity lives.
11,842 customers
Elasticity vs relationship value
Click a dot · drag to lasso · hover a chip to isolate
Each dot = 1 customer · sample 300 of 11,842
Hover a dot for detail · click to open customer
Size of prize · current filters
If repriced to indifference
If every customer in this selection were repriced to their modelled indifference rate:
OMR 2.88m annual interest saved
Modelled attrition: 6.2% of balances (OMR 38m)
Quadrant distribution
Elasticity drivers · aggregate ranking
1. Historical rate response
0.47
feature importance (SHAP mean |φ|)
2. Share of wallet at Bank Muscat
0.32
share of total wealth
3. Salary-credit relationship
0.28
boolean + tenure
4. Tenure with bank
0.24
months
5. Rollover behaviour at maturity
0.19
boolean, 3 last cycles
6. Digital channel engagement
0.16
0–100 score
Customers in current selection · top 25 by annual overpayment
| Customer | Governorate | Archetype | Balance | Rate paid | Indiff rate | Overpayment p.a. | Elasticity | Quadrant |
|---|
Click a row for a full customer explanation and action plan.
Ask the elasticity analyst
AI
Elasticity analyst
Scoped to current scatter filters · 300 live records
Repricing workbench
Stage a repricing action
Pick segment · set rate change · choose mechanism · see interest saved, attrition, net benefit before you commit.
Build a repricing action
Rollover offer · only touches rollovers at maturity
Base model · fitted on 2024-26 rollover history
Interest expense saved
OMR 2.45m
per annum
Modelled attrition
6.2%
OMR 38m balance outflow
Net benefit
OMR 1.87m
interest saved less replacement cost
Immediate readout · before commit
Live recomputation · each line has an Explain
| Customers affected | 4,180 |
| Balance in segment | OMR 612m |
| Current avg rate | 4.15% |
| Proposed avg rate | 3.75% |
| Modelled indifference rate | 3.68% |
| Worst-case attrition (2× model) | 12.4% · OMR 76m |
| Blended cost of funds impact | −2.2 bps |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio shift | +0.3 pp |
| LCR impact | Within appetite |
Staged actions · maker-checker queue (4)
Click an action to open its full workflow
| # | Segment | Bps | Net benefit | Cumulative | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SA-241 | Overpaid Loyalists · 12m term | −40 | OMR 1.87m | OMR 1.87m | pending check |
| SA-242 | Pensioners · 6m term | −25 | OMR 0.42m | OMR 2.29m | pending check |
| SA-243 | Dhofar · 12m rollover | −30 | OMR 0.63m | OMR 2.92m | pending check |
| SA-244 | Al Mazyona ladder bonus | +10 | OMR −0.14m | OMR 2.78m | cumulative attrition 10.4% (above appetite) |
⚠ Four individually sensible actions together breach the 8% attrition appetite. The system refuses to approve without an override reason.
CASA migration engine
Term holders · scored for CASA conversion
CASA share is the lever with the largest margin effect. Offer construction uses non-rate inducements to avoid giving away margin on the way to a bigger margin.
Migration economics · per OMR 100m moved
12m term → savings/current
| Gross saving p.a. | OMR 3.30m |
| Less offer cost | OMR 340k |
| Net p.a. | OMR 2.96m |
| Blended CoF Δ | −2.6 bps |
| CASA share Δ | +0.9 pp |
| LCR Δ | −1.4 pp |
Payback: 1.4 months. Break-even attrition: 11.2%. Current modelled: 3.8%.
Liquidity trade-off · at a glance
Stability cost of the margin gain
| Stability vs term | −22% less sticky |
| Current LCR | 142% |
| Regulatory floor | 100% |
| Board floor (hard stop) | 125% |
| Headroom to board floor | 17 pp |
| Defensible to | ~130% LCR 5 pp buffer above board floor |
Stance: capture at origination (Sultan Haitham inflow) rather than convert existing term holders — scenario B targets 150k holders (OMR 73m).
Term holders · ranked by conversion propensity
Grouped by recommended action · click a customer for workflow · tick to multi-select
Benchmarking Micro AI · synthetic
Rate board vs the market
Benchmarked against every CBO-licensed bank in Oman, with transparent sources, data freshness, and a side-by-side ranking vs Bank Muscat on every tenor.
| Bank | 3m | 6m | 12m | 24m | 36m | Savings | Source | Age | Position vs BM |
|---|
* Islamic banks publish expected profit rates (Mudaraba / Wakala), not interest. All competitor rates are synthetic and labelled as such. Green = Bank Muscat better (lower cost of funds); Red = Bank Muscat worse. Click any Source link for provenance; click Age for data freshness detail.
Rate-move simulator · tenor-by-tenor
Set your target rate per tenor · impact recomputes live
Tenor
Target rate
BM now
Market best
Impact p.a.
Net impact (all tenors):
OMR 0 p.a.
· attrition averted OMR 0
· blended CoF Δ 0 bps
Response options · click for detailed impact
| Response | Cost p.a. | Retained | Recommend |
|---|---|---|---|
| Match all tenors to market best | OMR 4.1m | 100% | no |
| Target high-elasticity segment only | OMR 1.45m | 88% | yes |
| Do nothing (accept outflow) | OMR 2.3m repl. | 62% | outflow OMR 198m |
Position map · rate gap vs elasticity
Dot = tenor · size = deposit balance · x-axis in bps · y-axis is modelled elasticity
Reading this chart: dots in the upper-left (big gap · high elasticity) are the fastest to leave. Dots in the lower-right are safe gaps. Dot size shows how much money is at risk per tenor.
Top recommendations · ranked by RoI
Meethaq profit rate module · Islamic
Mudaraba profit sharing · not interest
Islamic carve-out mechanics differ. Expected profit rates for Wakala and profit-sharing ratios for Mudaraba, presented as what they are.
Interface note: profit rates and structures shown in this module are set within the product terms approved by the Sharia Supervisory Board. Nothing in this screen proposes a Sharia ruling.
Profit distribution pool · last quarter
| Income generated by Mudaraba pool | OMR 14.2m |
| Bank Muscat Mudarib share (20%) | OMR 2.84m |
| Depositors' share (80%) | OMR 11.36m |
| — Allocated to 3m tenor pool | OMR 2.1m · profit rate 2.95% |
| — Allocated to 6m tenor pool | OMR 2.8m · profit rate 3.42% |
| — Allocated to 12m tenor pool | OMR 4.1m · profit rate 4.15% |
| — Allocated to 24m+ tenor pool | OMR 2.36m · profit rate 4.55% |
Reserves · smoothing effect over 12m
| Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER) | OMR 1.2m |
| Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) | OMR 0.84m |
| Smoothing effect on distributed rate | +8 bps uplift this period |
| Displaced commercial risk · modelled cost | OMR 0.42m |
| Cost of holding distributed rate at market level when pool underperforms | tracked separately |
Reserve balances protect distributed profit rates when pool income is volatile. The Mudarib share is forgone first to maintain the depositor rate.
Mudarib share & reserve optimiser
Live sliders · Sharia-board-approved ranges
Levers · within SSB ranges
SSB-approved range: 10% – 35%. Current: 20%.
PER balance OMR 1.2m · max draw OMR 1.2m/period.
IRR balance OMR 0.84m · covers loss-absorption first.
Base Q · OMR 14.2m. Try stressing low (10m) or high (18m).
Bank Mudarib income
OMR 2.84m
unchanged vs base
Depositor share paid
80.0% split · 80.0%
PER + IRR runway
8 quarters
at current draw cadence · OMR 2.04m total reserves
Smoothing uplift this period
+0 bps
on distributed depositor rate
Per-tenor depositor rate · live
Rate depositors would see this period under current levers
| Tenor | Base rate | New rate | Δ | Pool $ | Market median |
|---|
AI recommendation
Cheapest combination that keeps rates competitive
—
Profit rate forecaster
Next quarter · pool income + per-tenor rate band
Pool income forecast · Q4 2026
Drivers: scheduled Ijara/Murabaha payments, defaults, new business pipeline
| Scheduled profit (financing book) | OMR 15.4m |
| Less expected defaults (2.1% · stage 3) | −OMR 0.32m |
| Less early-settlement rebate | −OMR 0.18m |
| Less two Ijara maturities (large contracts) | −OMR 1.1m |
| Plus new Diminishing Musharaka · pipeline | +OMR 0.42m |
| Expected pool income | OMR 14.22m |
| 80% confidence range | OMR 13.5m – 14.9m |
Model: ISLAM-FCST-v2.0 · 24-month backtest MAE 2.8% of pool income · 11/12 quarters within band.
Expected profit rate per tenor · Q4 2026
Point estimate + 80% band · driver notes per tenor
Displaced commercial risk · early warning
Our profit rate vs Islamic peers
DCR triggers when the expected profit rate falls materially below Islamic competitor profit rates. The bank must forgo Mudarib share — or draw reserves — to protect the depositor rate. Alerts below are ranked by probability × cost.
| Tenor | Expected rate | Peer median (Nizwa, Alizz) | Gap | P(DCR trigger) | Expected cost | Period |
|---|
Click a row for AI recommendations on the most defensible response.
Standalone funding-cost gap · solver
CEO's 56 bps · what closes it
Current blended · integrated
3.28%
Modelled · standalone
3.84%
Funding-cost gap
+56 bps
Decomposition · where the 56 bps comes from
| Loss of parent's CASA base (standalone has thinner Islamic CASA) | +24 bps |
| Term-skewed deposit mix (Islamic customers prefer defined-tenor products) | +15 bps |
| Wakala-vs-Mudaraba imbalance (too much Wakala — fixed-rate obligation) | +9 bps |
| DCR premium (reserves inadequate at standalone size) | +6 bps |
| Shared-service cost allocation (operational dis-synergy) | +2 bps |
| Total gap | +56 bps |
Levers · solve interactively
Each OMR 20m adds ≈ 4 bps · reduces CASA-base penalty.
Lengthening term reduces churn cost · each 10% worth ≈ 7 bps.
Current 42%. Lower = more Mudaraba (profit-shared, flexible).
Reserve build reduces DCR premium · one-time cost, recurring saving.
bps closed
0 bps
of 56 bps gap · 0%
Remaining gap
56 bps
if current levers held
AI recommendation
Move the levers to see the AI's recommended lever combination.
What-if simulator
Drag · observe · defend
Every control recomputes against the live model in under 500ms. No "run" button — outputs update as you drag so you can see how sensitive each assumption is.
Input controls
Reference-rate shift from CBO. Flows into pricing with 2-month lag.
Blended CoF Δ
0 bps
from 268 bps to 268 bps
Net interest income Δ
OMR 0
per annum · NIM shift 0 bps
Balance attrition
OMR 0
0.0% of selected balances
LCR effect
0.0 pp
from current 142% · within appetite
12-month NII trajectory · scenario vs base
80% confidence band on scenario
Plain-language summary · auto-generated
The scenario holds all rates at base. There is no change to the margin or the funding mix. Set a non-zero control to see the model's response.
Forecasting · 12/24/36 months
Forecasts with visible backtests
Every forecast is accompanied by a backtest showing how the same model performed against the preceding 12 months of actual data, with the mean absolute error stated.
Blended cost of funds · forecast
80% confidence band · method: maturity roll-forward
Backtest: ran model as at 2025-07 against 2026-07 actual · MAE 4.2 bps · 11/12 months within band · outlier Mar 2026 (unexpected gov deposit withdrawal)
Deposit balance · by product
Stacked: Current + Savings + Fixed · term modelled explicitly
Method: Fixed (term) by maturity-roll-forward with segment-specific rollover rates. Savings and Current by behavioural models by archetype with seasonality. New-to-bank added separately.
Early-warning monitor
Click a row for detail + AI recommendations
| Segment | Expected | Observed | Variance | Likely cause |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12m term · Dhofar | −3.1% | −6.8% | −3.7 pp | Sohar International 3m rate move drew Khareef-season money |
| Al Mazyona · all | +8.7% | +12.4% | +3.7 pp | Q3 prize announcement + fee waiver on remittance |
| Government operational | flat | −4.2% | −4.2 pp | MoF year-end spending acceleration (policy-driven) |
| CASA · retail Omani | +2.1% | +1.9% | on track | — |
Scenario library
Pre-loaded demo scenarios
Each is a saved scenario the presenter opens in one click, with narration built in.
A
B
C
D
E
F
Deposit Analyst BOT
Deposit Analyst BOT
Ask in natural language. The bot queries the dataset, runs the pricing / elasticity / LCR models, and answers with numbers you can trace in two clicks.